

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----060816 260036Z /62

O 252130Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3297
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LAGOS 9768
EXDIS
FROM MOOSE AND PETTERSON

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV, RH, UK
SUBJECT: RHODESIA PROPOSALS

REF: (A) PRETORIA 4270, (B) STATE 202607, (C) DAR ES SALAAM 3405,
(D) DAR ES SALAAM 3461, (E) STATE 202373

BILL BOWDLER'S WORRIES ABOUT HOW TO BREAK THE NEWS TO THE SOUTH
AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ABOUT PARAGRAPH 11E (REF A AND JIM SPAIN'S
CABLES ABOUT NYERERE'S CONTINUING CONCERNS ABOUT BASING THE NEW
ZIMBABWE ARMY (PREDOMINANTLY) ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (REFS C AND D)
PRESENT THE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. PUT ANOTHER WAY, THEY
POSE THIS DILEMMA: HOW DO WE AVOID GIVING ALARM TO VORSTER, SMITH
AND THEIR PUBLICS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, MEETING THE FRONT LINE
DEMAND THAT SMITH'S FORCES MUST GO. FURTHER COMPLICATING
THIS MATTER ARE THE DIFFERING AND SOMETIMES COMPATING,
INTERESTS AND EMPHASES AMONG THE FRONT LINE AND THE NATIONALIST.

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2. NYERERE, FROM THE OUTSET OF OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH HIM,
HAS PLACED PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
TRANSITION AND POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIODS. BECAUSE WE WERE
RELYING UPON HIM TO GET OUR INITIATIVE PRESENTED TO THE FRONT LINE
IN A FAVORABLE LIGHT, WE WERE WILLING TO INCORPORATE NYERERE'S
POINT REGARDING THE FUTURE ZIMBABWE ARMY INTO AN AGREED STATEMENT
OF BASIC PRINCIPLES. IN ANY EVENT, WE ALL BELIEVED NYERERE'S

STIPULATION REFLECTED THE REALISTIC, INEVITABLE MAKEUP OF THE FUTURE ARMY.

3. ALTHOUGH WE INFORMED THE BRITISH IN GENERAL TERMS OF THE FOUR PRINCIPLES WHICH WE HAD DISCUSSED WITH NYERERE, THEY APPARENTLY DID NOT AT FIRST FOCUS CLOSELY ON THE ZIMBABWE ARMY ASPECT. PERHAPS WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SPECIFIC, OR PERHAPS THE BRITISH MAY HAVE THOUGHT THE ISSUE COULD BE DOWNPLAYED OR FINESSED. WHATEVER THE EXPLANATION(S), BRITISH RELUCTANCE TO PARALLEL OUR COMMITMENT ON FUTURE OF THE ZIMBABWE ARMY QUICKLY BECAME THE SUBSTANTIVE CAUSE CELEBRA ONCE NYERERE AND THE BRITISH CAME FACE TO FACE. IN MY VIEW, THIS CONFLICT WAS INEVITABLE.

4. THERE ARE PROBABLY SEVERAL REASONS WHY THE BRITISH WERE RELUCTANT ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF A ZIMBABWE ARMY "BASED PREDOMINANTLY ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF) FORCES":

- (A) THE PF IS FAR TOO RADICAL FOR THEIR TASTE;
- (B) THEY FELT THE FORMULA WOULD JEOPARDIZE WHITE RHODESIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER OUR PROPOSAL;
- (C) OWEN'S CONTINUING WILLINGNESS TO FLIRT WITH THE IDEA OF AN INTERNAL SOLUTION WHICH, IN THE SHORT TERM, WOULD BE LESS COMPLICATED FOR THEM.
- (D) THEIR SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE RELIABILITY AND POLITICAL PRACTICABILITY OF A UN FORCE.

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5. NYERERE'S BLOWUP IN LONDON FORCED THE ISSUE. IN AN EFFORT TO GET THE FRONT LINE MEETING BACK ON TRACK, WE REITERATED IN WRITING THE FOUR PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING THAT DEALING WITH THE ZIMBABWE ARMY. UNAWARE OF WHAT WE WERE WRITING, THE BRITISH STILL HEDGED, SO THAT WHEN NYERERE READ CALLAGHAN'S LETTER JUST AFTER RECEIVING PRESIDENT CARTER'S REASSURANCES, HE EXPLODED AGAIN. IT THEN TOOK A WEEK TO GET THE BRITISH IN LINE, BUT EVEN THEN WE FEARED THAT WE HAD ONLY PAPERED OVER OUR DIFFERENCES. THE BRITISH CLEARLY CONTINUED TO HOPE THAT THE BASIC COMMITMENT COULD BE AVOIDED. THIS WAS NEXT REFLECTED IN THEIR DESIRE TO DROP "PRE-DOMINANTLY" AND TO SUBSTITUTE "LIBERATION ARMIES" OR "PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES" IN THE CALLAGHAN LETTERS.

6. AT THE END OF OUR LONDON TALKS WE REALIZED THAT THE BASIC PROPOSAL DOCUMENT, NOW A DRAFT WHITE PAPER, DID NOT INCLUDE MENTION OF THE ZIMBABWE ARMY. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A SERIOUS OMISSION IN ANY EVENT, BUT ONCE NYERERE HAD MADE AN ISSUE OF THE ARMY (CONSISTANT WITH HIS ORIGINAL EMPHASIS IN WASHINGTON) MENTION OF IT BECAME UNAVOIDABLE. THE FACT THAT THIS FEATURE HAD TO BE ADDED AFTER THE DRAFT PROPOSAL WAS GIVEN TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS, HOWEVER, NOW MAKES ITS INCLUSION AND PRESENTATION MORE DIFFICULT. SOONER OR LATER WE WOULD HAVE HAD TO FACE THIS

PROBLEM -- NO MATTER HOW IT WAS HANDLED AT THE OUTSET.

7. WHEN NYERERE REPORTED TO HIS COLLEAGUES ON HIS ENCOUNTER WITH OWEN, HE PORTRAYED THE ZIMBABWE ARMY ISSUE AS A BROAD AND SIMPLE QUESTION OF WHETHER "SMITH'S ARMY" WOULD GO OR STAY. OF COURSE NONE OF US EVER THOUGHT THAT THE EXISTING RHODESIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WOULD SURVIVE INTACT INTO THE INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT NYEREE HAS HAD TWO OBJECTIES IN MIND ALL ALONG: (A) HE WANTS TO MAKE SURE THAT THE WHITE RHODESIAN HOLD WAS CLEARLY BROKEN AND (B) HE WANTS TO MAKE SURE THAT THE BASE OF THE ZIMBABWE ARMY IS HIS REPEAT HIS VERSION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND NOT MERELY "THE PATRIOTIC FRONT." THE SECOND OF THESE OBJECTIVES POSES A PROBLEM WHICH WILL LIKELY BE AS DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH AS PRESENTING THE CONFIDENTIAL

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ZIMBABWE ARMY TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, MS LONGETEIG.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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O 252130Z AUG 77
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LAGOS 9768
EXDIS
FROM MOOSE AND PETTERSON

8. NYERERE'S DESIRE TO PUT HIS STAMP ON THE ZIMBABWE ARMY SEEMS CLEAR. IT WAS EVIDENT IN A SUBTLE WAY IN HIS CONVEREATIONS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. WHEN WE REDUCED THE FOUR PRINCIPLES TO WRITING AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S FIRST MEETING WITH NYERERE WE WROTE "BASED PREDOMINANTLY ON PATRIOTIC FRONT." WE ARE TOLD THAT THE PRESIDENT REVIEWED THESE POINTS WITH NYERERE OVERNIGHT. WHEN THE PRESIDENT RESTATED THE ZIMBABWE ARMY PRINCIPLE AT THE OUTSET OF THE SECOND MEETING HE ADDED AT THE END OF "...BASED ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT," THE PHRASE "IN TANZANIA." WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER NYERERE HAD SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED THIS AMENDMENT BUT IT WAS IMPLICIT IN NYERERE'S FIRST-DAY PRESENTATION. OBASANMO'S REFERENCE TO THREE ARMIES IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD --NKOMO'S, MUGABE'S AND NYERERE'S -- AND HIS RECOUNTING OF HOW NYERERE PUT HIS PATRIOTIC FRONT TOGETHER, CLEARLY INDICATE TO ME THAT OBASANJO PERCEIVES A CERTAIN INTENT ON NYERERE'S PART.

9. NYERERE HAS AT LEAST TWO MOTIVES, NOT NECESSARILY MUTUALLY CONFIDENTIAL

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EXCLUSIVE: HE WANTS TO AVOID AN ANGOLA SITUATION AND HE WANTS TO MAXIMIZE HIS INFLUENCE IN ZIMBABWE. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS INTERESTING TO RECALL THAT HE JOKINGLY REMARKED TO THE PRESIDENT IN ANOTHER CONTEXT THAT THE ARMY WOULD EVENTUALLY TAKE OVER IN ZIMBABWE AS IT HAS ELSEWHERE.

10. WE DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT HOW THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS VIEW THE FUTURE ZIMBABWE ARMY, BUT CAN MAKE SOME FAIRLY SAFE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT NKOMO'S AND MUGABE'S AMBITIONS. OWEN TOLD US THAT NKOMO HAS BEEN ANXIOUS TO TALK TO KAUNDA, AND THAT OWEN WAS WILLING TO DELAY THE FRONT LINE MEETING IN ORDER TO GIVE HIM THAT CHANCE. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OWEN'S INTEREST IN AN EXTERNAL DEAL. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, NKOMO IS NOT AS NEGATIVE ABOUT INTEGRATING THE FORMER RHODESIAN FORCES AS ARE NYERERE AND KAUNDA. MAYBE NKOMO SEES THESE WELL TRAINED TROOPS AS A USEFUL FOIL TO MUGABE. OR MAYBE HE JUST WANTS TO MAKE A DEAL AND IS SUGGESTING A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SOME RHODESIAN ELEMENTS AS A REASSURANCE AND COME-ON.

11. MUGABE IS HARDER FOR ME TO FIGURE. WOULD MACHEL BACK HIM FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS OR WOULD MACHEL'S DEPENDENCE UPON THE SOVIETS AND THEIR BACKING OF NKOMO DETER MACHEL?

12. KAUNDA'S POSITION ON THE ZIMBABWE ARMY HAS NOT YET COME THROUGH CLEARLY. WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT THERE WILL BE SOME FANCY FOOTWORK GOING ON IN LUSAKA BEFORE WE GET THERE. TO REFER AGAIN TO OBASANJO, WE LEARNED TODAY THAT HE IS PROVIDING A PLANE TO TAKE MUGABE AND, I THINK, NKOMO TO LUSAKA. THIS FOLLOWS OBASANJO'S ACCOUNT TO US OF HOW HE READ THE RIOT ACT TO THE

TWO OF THEM. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO OBSERVE WHETHER THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS WILL EXERT SIMILAR PRESSURE. (IT MAY ALSO BE INTERESTING TO SEE IF BOTH MEN ARE STILL ON THE PLANE WHEN IT GETS TO LUSAKA.)
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13. THUS, TO GO BACK TO THE PROBLEMS AND ILEMAS REFERRED TO IN PARA ONE, AND JIM SPAIN'S QUERIES IN REF C, WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE BRITISH, BE CAREFUL OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND WATCH THE INTERPLAY OF THE AFRICANS. THE FRONT LINE WILL SURELY PROBE THE COMMITMENT OF THE BRITISH AND, IN DOING SO, WOULD BE QUICK TO NOTE ANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE UK. BUT WHILE THIS IS GOING ON, WE MAY SEE -- UNLESS THE FRONT LINE GETS ITS ACT TOGETHER AND ITS CLIENTS IN LINE -- SOME INTERESTING DIFFERENCES AMONG THEM.

14. WE WOULD CONCUR WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESUMPTION THAT WE WOULD EMPLOY THE FORMULATION ""BASED ON THE "LIBERATION ARMIES" IN CONVEREATIONS WITH THE FRONT LINE (STATE 202373) . USING THIS LANGUAGE MIGHT SMOKE OUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NYERERE AND HIS COLLEAGUES. BUT NOT NECESSARILY. THEY MAY ASK IF OUR NEW FORMULA MEANS THE EAME THING AS NYERER'S AND IF THEY DO, WE SHOULD CONFIRM THAT IT DOES. (INCIDENTALLY IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW FROM JIM SPAIN WHETHER NYERERE HAS EVER TAKEN NOTE OF THE DIFFERENTING FORMULATIONS.) THE QUESTION WHICH WILL THEN ARISE WILL BE HOW THE NEW FORCE IS TO BE PUT TOGETHER. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE ANSWER TO JIM SPAIN'S QUESTION IN PARA 2 OF REF C, IS THAT THE UK RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO CONSULT WITH SOMEONE. BUT WITH WHOM? PERHAPS THE FRONT LINE WILL SUGGEST AN ANSWER. OBASANJO PUT HIS FINGER SQUARELY ON WHAT MAY BE THE BOTTOM LINE WHEN HE SAID TO US EARLIER THIS WEEK (LAGOS 9623) "THE QUESTION FOR RESOLUTION (IS) HOW TO DETERMINE THE MIX OR BALANCE OF THESE (LIBERATION) FACTIONS IN THE EVENTUAL ZIMBABWE ARMY.

15. ONE FINAL THOUGHT: WHAT HAPPENDS IF THE ELEMENT(S) WHICH DETERMINE THE MIX LOSE THE ELECTION -- PRESUMING WE EVER GET THAT FAR. LIKE SCARLETT, WE ARE INCLINED TO "WORRY ABOUT THAT TOMORROW." OTHERS MIGHT ECHO RHETT'S PARTING COMMENT
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Message Attributes

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